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Abstract
We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a robust-design approach. We
solve for the policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where the regret is
the difference between his complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When
the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, it is optimal to impose a price cap. The
optimal cap balances the benefit from more surplus for consumers and the loss from
underproduction. When his payoff is consumers’ surplus plus the firm’s profit, he offers
a piece-rate subsidy in order to mitigate underproduction, but caps the total subsidy
so as not to incentivize severe overproduction.
JEL: D81, D82, D86
Keywords: monopoly regulation, regret, non-Bayesian, price cap, piece-rate subsidy
1 Introduction
Regulating monopolies is challenging. A monopolistic firm has the market power to set its
price above that in an oligopolistic or competitive market. For instance, Cooper et al. (2018)
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show that prices at monopoly hospitals are 12% higher than those in markets with four or
five rivals. In order to protect consumer well-being, a regulator may want to constrain the
firm’s price. However, a price-constrained firm may fail to obtain enough revenue to cover
its fixed cost, so may end up not producing. The regulator must balance the need to protect
consumer well-being and the need to not distort the production.
This challenge could be solved easily if the regulator had complete information about the
industry. The regulator could ask the firm to produce at the socially optimal level and to set
price equal to the marginal cost. He could then subsidize the firm for all of its other costs.
However, the regulator typically has limited information about the consumer demand or the
technological capacity of the firm. How shall the regulatory policy be designed when the
regulator knows considerably less about the industry than the firm does? If the regulator
demands robustness and wants a policy that works “fairly well” in all circumstances, what
shall this policy look like?
We address this classic problem of monopoly regulation (e.g., Baron and Myerson (1982))
with a non-Bayesian approach. The regulator’s payoff is a weighted sum of consumers’
surplus and the firm’s profit. He can regulate the firm’s price and/or quantity. He can give
a subsidy to the firm or charge a tax from it. Given a policy, the firm chooses its price and
quantity to maximizes its profit. The regret to the regulator is the difference between what
he could have gotten if he had complete information about the industry and what he actually
gets. The regulator evaluates a policy by its worst-case regret, i.e., the maximal regret he
can incur across all possible demand and cost scenarios. The optimal policy minimizes the
worst-case regret.
The worst-case regret approach to uncertainty is our most significant difference from
Baron and Myerson (1982) and the literature on monopoly regulation in general. Baron
and Myerson (1982) take a Bayesian approach to uncertainty by assigning a prior to the
regulator over the demand and cost scenarios and characterizing the policy that minimizes
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the expected regret. (Minimizing the expected regret is the same as maximizing the expected
payoff, since the regulator’s expected complete-information payoff is constant.) We instead
focus on industries where information asymmetry is so pronounced that there is no obvious
way to formulate a prior, or industries where new sources of uncertainty arise all the time.
(See Hayek (1945), Weitzman (1974) and Carroll (2019), for instance, for elaboration of
these points.) In response, the regulator looks for a robust policy that works fairly well in
all circumstances.
To illustrate our solution, we begin with two extreme cases of the regulator’s payoff. If
the regulator puts no weight on the firm’s profit, so his payoff is consumers’ surplus, then
it is optimal to impose a price cap. A price cap bounds how much consumers’ surplus that
the firm can extract. Consumers benefit from a lower price. However, a price cap might
discourage a firm which should have produced from producing. Consumers lose in this case
due to the firm’s underproduction. The optimal level of the price cap balances consumers’
gain from a lower price and their loss from the firm’s underproduction.
If the regulator puts the same weight on the firm’s profit as he does on consumers’ surplus,
so his payoff is the total surplus of consumers and the firm, then the regulator simply wants
the firm to produce as efficiently as possible. Given that an unregulated monopolistic firm
tends to supply less than the efficient level, the regulator wants to encourage more production
by subsidizing the firm. However, subsidy might incentivize production above the efficient
level. The optimal design of subsidy must balance the loss from underproduction and that
from overproduction.
The regulator will have a target price and a subsidy cap. For each unit that the firm
sells, he subsidizes the firm for the difference between its price and the target price, subject
to the constraint that the total subsidy doesn’t exceed the subsidy cap. This piece-rate
subsidy up to the target price effectively lifts the firm’s selling price, motivating the firm to
serve more than just those consumers with high values. On the other hand, the cap on the
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firm’s total subsidy makes sure that the regulator doesn’t lose too much from the potential
overproduction.
For intermediate payoffs, the regulator puts some weight on the firm’s profit, but this
weight is lower than the weight he puts on consumers’ surplus. He must balance three
goals simultaneously: giving more surplus to consumers, mitigating underproduction and
mitigating overproduction. It is optimal to combine the price cap and the subsidy rule
described above, leading to a regulatory policy with three distinctive features. First, the
regulator will impose a price cap so the firm can’t get more than the price cap per unit.
Second, the firm gets a piece-rate subsidy instead of a lump-sum one. Third, the firm is
subsidized up to the price cap subject to a cap on the total subsidy it will get. As the
regulator puts more weight on the firm’s profit, the level of this price cap increases.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we solve for an optimal regulatory policy. Second,
our result explains why price cap regulation and piece-rate subsidy are common in practice.
Third, we introduce the worst-case regret approach to the regulation problem. We advocate
for this approach over the Bayesian approach for the two shortcomings of the Bayesian
approach that are also emphasized in Armstrong and Sappington (2007). First, since the
relevant information asymmetries can be difficult to characterize precisely, it is not clear
how to formulate a prior. Second, since multi-dimensional screening problems are difficult
to solve, the form of optimal regulatory policies is generally not known.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on monopoly regulation.
Caillaud et al. (1988) and Braeutigam (1989) provide an overview of earlier contributions in
this field. Armstrong and Sappington (2007) discuss the recent developments. Our paper is
closely related to Baron and Myerson (1982). The most significant difference is our approach
to uncertainty. Baron and Myerson (1982) take a Bayesian approach to uncertainty, and
assume that there is a one-dimensional cost parameter that is unknown to the regulator.
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We take a non-Bayesian, worst-case regret approach, and assume that the regulator lacks
information about both the demand and the cost functions.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature of mechanism design with worst-case
objectives. Carroll (2019) provides a survey of recent theory in this field. Most of this
literature assumes that the designer aims to maximize his worst-case payoff. We assume
that the designer aims to minimize his worst-case regret. From this aspect, we are closely
related to Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), Bergemann and Schlag (2008, 2011), Renou and
Schlag (2011), and Beviá and Corchón (2019). Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978) show that a
50-50 split is an optimal sharecropping contract when the optimality criterion involves the
ratio of the designer’s payoff to the first-best total surplus. Bergemann and Schlag (2008,
2011) examine robust monopoly pricing and argue that minimizing the worst-case regret
is more relevant than maximizing the worst-case payoff, since the latter criterion suggests
pricing to the lowest-value buyer. Renou and Schlag (2011) apply the solution concept of
ε-minimax regret to the problem of implementing social choice correspondences. Beviá and
Corchón (2019) characterize contests in which contestants have dominant strategies and find
within this class the contest for which the designer’s worst-case regret is minimized.
Minimizing the worst-case regret is more relevant a criterion in our setting as well for two
reasons. First, the regret in our setting has a natural interpretation: it is the weighted sum
of distortion in production and the firm’s profit. Second, the regulator’s worst-case payoff is
zero or less under any policy, since consumers’ values might be too low relative to the cost.
In this case, there is no surplus even under complete information. When there is no surplus,
there is nothing the regulator can do. We argue that, instead, the regulator’s goal should be
to protect surplus in situations where there is some surplus to protect. The notion of regret
catches this idea.
The worst-case regret approach goes back at least to Savage (1954). Under this approach,
when a decision maker has to choose some action facing uncertainty, he chooses the action
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that minimizes the worst-case regret across all possible realizations of the uncertainty. The
regret is defined as the difference between what the decision maker could achieve given the
realization, and what he achieves under this action. In our case, the regulator has uncertainty
about the demand and cost functions and he has to choose a policy. Savage also puts forward
an interpretation of the worst-case regret approach in the context of group decision, which is
relevant for our policy design context. Consider a group of people who must jointly choose a
policy. They have the same payoffs but different probability judgements. Under the policy
that minimizes the worst-case regret no member of the group faces a large regret, so no
member will feel that the suggestion is a serious mistake. Seminal game theory papers in
which players try to minimize worst-case regret include Hannan (1957) and Hart and Mas-
Colell (2000). Minimizing worst-case regret is also the leading approach in online learning,
and in particular in multi-armed bandit problems (see Bubeck, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012)
for a survey).
Our work also contributes to the delegation literature (e.g., Holmström (1977); Holm-
ström (1984)). When the regulator cares only about consumers’ surplus, it is optimal to
simply impose a price cap. To our knowledge, we are the first to show that a delegation
contract — a contract that doesn’t use money — is optimal in a contracting environment
where both parties can transfer money to each other.
2 Environment
There is a monopolistic firm and a mass one of consumers. Let V : [0, 1] → [0, v¯] be a
decreasing upper-semicontinuous inverse-demand function. A quantity-price pair (q, p) ∈
[0, 1]× [0, v¯] is feasible if and only if it is below the inverse-demand function, i.e., p 6 V (q).
The total value to consumers of quantity q is the area under the inverse-demand function,
given by
∫ q
0
V (z) dz.
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Let C : [0, 1] → R+ with C(0) = 0 be an increasing lower-semicontinuous cost function.
The social optimum is given by:
OPT = max
q∈[0,1]
(∫ q
0
V (z) dz − C(q)
)
. (1)
If the firm produces q units, then the (market) distortion is given by:
DSTR = OPT−
(∫ q
0
V (z) dz − C(q)
)
. (2)
To simplify notation, we omitted the dependence of OPT on V, C and the dependence of
DSTR on V, C and q. We will do the same for some other terms in this section when no
confusion arises.
Regulatory policies
A policy is given by an upper-semicontinuous function ρ : [0, 1] × [0, v¯] → R. If the firm
sells q units at price p, then it receives revenue ρ(q, p). The firm’s revenue from the policy,
ρ(q, p), includes the revenue qp from the marketplace, and any tax or subsidy, ρ(q, p)− qp,
imposed by the regulator. We give three examples of regulatory policies:
1. A regulator who decides not to intervene will choose ρ(q, p) = qp, so the firm’s revenue
ρ(q, p) equals its revenue from the marketplace.
2. The regulator can give the firm a lump-sum subsidy s if it sells more than a certain
quantity q˜. The policy is ρ(q, p) = qp if q < q˜ and ρ(q, p) = qp+ s if q > q˜.
3. The regulator can require that the firm get no more than k per unit. The policy is
ρ(q, p) = min(qp, qk). If the firm prices above k, it pays a tax of q(p − k) to the
regulator.
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Fix a policy ρ, an inverse-demand function V and a cost function C. If the firm produces
q units at price p, then consumers’ surplus and the firm’s profit are given by:
CS =
∫ q
0
V (z) dz − ρ(q, p), and FP = ρ(q, p)− C(q). (3)
The definition of consumers’ surplus incorporates the fact that any subsidy to the firm is paid
by consumers through their taxes and that any tax from the firm goes to the consumers. We
also assume that ρ(0, 0) > 0, so the firm is allowed to stay out of business without suffering
a negative profit. This is the participation constraint.
We say that (q, p) is a firm’s best response to (V, C) under the policy ρ if it maximizes
the firm’s profit over all feasible (q, p). The firm might have multiple best responses. The
participation constraint implies that FP > 0 for every best response (q, p) of the firm.
The regulator’s payoff is a weighted sum, CS+αFP, of consumers’ surplus and the firm’s
profit for some fixed parameter α ∈ [0, 1].
Complete information
Fix an inverse-demand function V and a cost function C. We let CIP denote the regulator’s
complete-information payoff, which is what the regulator would achieve if he could tailor the
policy for these inverse-demand and cost functions. Formally,
CIP = max
ρ,q,p
(CS + αFP) , (4)
where the maximum ranges over all policies ρ and all firm’s best responses (q, p) to (V, C)
under ρ.
The following claim shows that the regulator’s complete-information payoff is the social
optimum. He would ask the firm to produce the socially optimal quantity and give the firm
a revenue equal to its cost. As a result, the maximum surplus is generated, all of which goes
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to consumers.
Claim 1. Fix an inverse-demand function V and a cost function C. Then CIP = OPT.
Proof. First, the regulator’s complete-information payoff is at most OPT. Indeed,
CS + αFP 6 CS + FP 6 OPT,
for every policy ρ and every best response (q, p) to (V, C) under ρ. Here the first inequality
follows from α 6 1 and the participation constraint FP > 0, and the second from the
definitions of CS,FP,OPT in (3) and (1).
Second, let q∗ denote a quantity that achieves the social optimum. The regulator can
achieve OPT by setting
ρ(q, p) =


C(q∗), if (q, p) = (q∗, V (q∗)),
0, otherwise.
Choosing (q, p) = (q∗, V (q∗)) is a firm’s best response to (V, C) under ρ which gives CS =
OPT and FP = 0, so CS + αFP = OPT.
Regret
When the regulator does not know (V, C), the policy will usually not give the regulator his
complete-information payoff. The regulator’s regret is the difference between what he could
have gotten under complete information and what he actually gets. The following step allows
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us to express regret in terms of distortion and the firm’s profit:
RGRT = CIP − (CS + αFP) = OPT− (CS + αFP)
= OPT− (CS + FP) + (1− α)FP
= DSTR + (1− α)FP.
Here, the first equality follows from the definition of regret, the second from Claim 1 that
CIP = OPT, and the rest is algebra.
Regret has a natural interpretation in our setting. DSTR represents the loss in efficiency,
since the regulator wishes the firm to produce as efficiently as possible. (1−α)FP represents
the loss in his redistribution objective, since the regulator wishes that more surplus goes to
consumers rather than to the firm.
The regulator’s problem
We look for the policy that minimizes the worst-case regret. Thus the regulator’s problem is
minimize
ρ
max
V,C,q,p
RGRT
where the minimization is over all policies ρ, and the maximum ranges over all (V, C) and
all the firm’s best responses (q, p) to (V, C) under ρ.
Formulating the regulator’s problem as a minimax problem is our only departure from
the literature on monopoly regulation. If we assigned a Bayesian prior to the regulator
over the demand and cost scenarios, minimizing the expected regret would be the same
as maximizing the expected payoff as in Baron and Myerson (1982). We instead consider
environments where the regulator knows only the range of consumers’ values, which is much
easier to figure out than formulating a prior.
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Remark 1. In the definition of CIP we assumed that the firm breaks ties in favor of the
regulator, whereas in the definition of the regulator’s problem we assumed that the firm
breaks ties against the regulator. These assumptions are for convenience only and do not
affect the value of CIP in Claim 1 or the solution to the regulator’s problem in Theorems 3.1
to 3.3.1
3 Main result
We first provide a lower bound on the worst-case regret of any policy. We then show that
our policy indeed achieves this lower bound, so it is optimal. Both the lower-bound and
upper-bound discussions center on the tradeoff between giving more surplus to consumers,
mitigating underproduction, and mitigating overproduction.
Suppose that the regulator imposes a price cap k. A price cap advances the regulator’s
redistribution objective by bounding how much consumers’ surplus the firm can extract, but
it may worsen the problem of underproduction. There is a price cap level that balances these
two forces. Explicitly, consider a market in which every consumer has the highest value v¯. If
the cost is zero, the firm will price at k and serve all consumers. There is no distortion since
all consumers are served, as it should be, but the firm’s profit is k. The regret is (1 − α)k.
The lower k is, the lower the regret is. On the other hand, if the firm has a fixed cost of
k, it is a firm’s best response not to produce. The firm’s profit is zero, but the distortion is
v¯ − k, which is the surplus that could have been made. The regret equals this distortion.
The lower k is, the higher the regret is. We let kα be the price cap such that these two levels
1If in the definition of CIP we assumed that the firm breaks ties against the regulator, we would define
CIP = sup
ρ
min
q,p
(CS + αFP),
where the minimum ranges over all firm’s best responses (q, p) to (V,C) under ρ. Then the supremum may
not be achieved, but the value of CIP would be the same. Similarly, if we assumed that the firm breaks ties
in favor of the regulator in the regulator’s problem then the “worst case” pair (V,C) may not exist, but the
solution to the regulator’s problem would remain the same.
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of regret are equalized, so kα = v¯/(2− α) as depicted in the left panel of Figure 1.
With this kα balancing the tradeoff between giving more surplus to consumers and miti-
gating underproduction, we are ready to establish a lower bound on the worst-case regret.
Theorem 3.1 (Lower bound on worst-case regret). Let
rα = max
q∈[0,1], p∈[0,kα]
min ((1− α)qkα − qp log q, q(kα − p)) . (5)
Then the worst-case regret under any policy is at least rα.
For any (q, p), we argue that the worst-case regret is at least the minimum of two terms.
Roughly speaking, the first term, (1 − α)qkα − qp log q, is the possible regret from under-
production if the revenue to the firm is too low. The second term, q(kα − p), is the possible
regret from overproduction if the revenue is too high. No matter how the policy is designed,
the regulator has to suffer from one of these two. Since the worst-case regret is at least
the minimum of these two for every (q, p), we can take the maximum over q ∈ [0, 1] and
p ∈ [0, kα].
Let qα achieve the maximum in the definition of rα in (5). When α 6 1/2, qα equals one.
When α > 1/2, qα is interior. The explicit values of rα and qα are given by:
rα = v¯


1−α
2−α α 6
1
2
(
2+α−
√
α(α+4)
)
e
1−
α+
√
α(α+4)
2
2(2−α) α >
1
2
.
, qα =


1, if α 6 1/2
e1−
α+
√
α(α+4)
2 , if α > 1/2.
The middle and right panels of Figure 1 depict the values of rα and qα.
Theorem 3.2 (Optimal policy). Let
sα = sup{q(kα − p) : q ∈ [0, 1], p ∈ [0, kα], (1− α)qkα − qp log q > rα}.
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0 1
v¯
v¯
2
α
kα
0 1
v¯
α
v¯
2 rα
0 1
1
α
qα
1/2
sα
Figure 1: Values of kα, rα, qα, and sα
The policy
ρ(q, p) = min(qkα, qp+ s) (6)
with sα 6 s 6 rα achieves the worst-case regret rα.
We first provide some intuition as to how a policy of the form (6) addresses the three
goals of giving more surplus to consumers, mitigating underproduction, and mitigating over-
production simultaneously. First, the firm can’t get more than kα for each unit it sells. This
caps how much consumers’ surplus that the firm can extract. Second, a monopolistic firm
has the tendency to serve just those consumers with very high values. In order to incentivize
the firm to produce more, the regulator subsidizes the firm for the difference between its price
and kα. This piece-rate subsidy effectively increases the firm’s selling price to kα. Third, the
firm’s total subsidy is capped by s, so the potential overproduction induced by subsidy is
also under control.
Depending on how much the regulator cares about the firm’s profit, he puts different
weights on these three goals, and hence varies kα and s as α varies.
The explicit value of sα is given below, and is depicted as the dashed line in the middle
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panel of Figure 1.
sα =


v¯ α
2−α α 6
1
2
rα α >
1
2
.
Note that sα = 0 when α = 0. Hence, the policy ρ(q, p) = qmin(v¯/2, p) is optimal when
α = 0, and it simply requires that the firm get less than v¯/2 per unit.
The optimal policy in Theorem 3.2 features three properties. First, the fact that ρ(q, p) 6
qkα for every q implies a price cap: The firm cannot get more than kα per unit sold. To see
the price cap more explicitly, consider the policy ρ˜ given by:
ρ˜(q, p) =


ρ(q, p) p 6 kα
−∞ p > kα.
The policy ρ˜ induces similar behavior to that of ρ in the sense that (q, p) is a best response
to ρ if and only if (q,min(p, kα)) is a best response to ρ˜ and these responses give the same
consumers’ surplus. Therefore, by Theorem 3.2, ρ˜ is also optimal. The second property is
that for some quantity-price pairs the total subsidy to the firm is at least sα. The third
property is that the total subsidy to the firm is at most rα. Theorem 3.3 asserts that every
optimal policy has similar properties. Recall that qα achieves the maximum in the definition
of rα in (5).
Theorem 3.3. Let ρ be an optimal policy. Then
1. (Price cap): ρ(q, p) 6 qkα for every q 6 qα.
2. (Subsidy): There exists some (q, p) such that ρ(q, p) > qp+ sα.
3. (Subsidy cap): ρ(q, p) 6 qp+ rα for every (q, p).
In particular, since qα = 1 for α 6 1/2, it follows from Theorem 3.3 that for α 6 1/2 a
price cap at kα is necessary for every level of production.
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4 Discussions
4.1 Incorporating additional knowledge
In our model we made no assumptions on the inverse-demand or the cost functions except
for monotonicity, semicontinuity, and the range of consumers’ values (between 0 and v¯).
The regulator may know more than this. We can extend our framework in an obvious way
to incorporate the regulator’s knowledge by restricting the set of inverse-demand and cost
functions in the regulator’s problem. For instance, the regulator may know that the firm
has a constant marginal cost together with a fixed cost, but doesn’t know these cost levels.
This is the type of cost functions used most frequently in studies of monopoly regulation.
In our proof of Theorem 3.1, we establish a lower bound on the worst-case regret of any
policy using only fixed cost functions, i.e., C(q) is constant for any q > 0. (See remark 2
for details.) This means that Theorem 3.1 remains true for every set of cost functions that
includes the set of all fixed cost functions. Once we know that Theorem 3.1 remains true,
we know that our policy in Theorem 3.2 remains optimal, since the worst-case regret under
our policy is at most rα across all inverse-demand and cost functions.
Of course, the regulator may do better than rα if he has significant knowledge about the
industry. We believe that incorporating the regulator’s additional knowledge is an exciting
direction for future research, which will demonstrate the adaptability of the worst-case regret
approach. Our analysis and policy serve as the very first step toward understanding the
optimal policy for any particular industry.
4.2 The efficient rationing assumption
In our model we allow the firm not to clear the market, and we assume that if this happens
then the consumers who are being served are the ones with higher values. Indeed, absent
some additional assumptions on the cost function, even a firm which operates under a price
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cap may prefer not to clear the market.
A common assumption in the monopoly regulation literature is that the firm has de-
creasing average cost, i.e., the average cost C(q)/q is decreasing for q > 0. Since the set of
all fixed cost functions satisfies the decreasing average property, by subsection 4.1 Theorem
3.1 remains correct under this decreasing average assumption on the cost function, and our
policy in Theorem 3.2 is optimal. Moreover, if the cost function satisfies this assumption,
then a firm which operates under our policy will want to clear the market.
5 Proofs
5.1 Preliminaries
For every q, p we let Vq,p and Wq,p be the inverse-demand functions given by:
Vq,p(z) =


v¯, if z 6 q
qp
z
, if q < z 6 1,
and Wq,p(z) =


p, if z 6 q
0, if q < z 6 1,
as shown in Figure 2. The inverse demand Wq,p has the property that, among all inverse-
demand functions under which (q, p) is feasible, Wq,p generates the least total value to con-
sumers.
0 1
v¯
q
p
z
qp
z
0 1q
v¯
p
Figure 2: Vq,p and Wq,p demand
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To understand the role of Vq,p in our argument, consider an unregulated firm (i.e., a firm
which operates under the policy ρ(q, p) = qp). If the inverse-demand function is Vq,p and the
cost is zero, then selling q units at price v¯ is a firm’s best response. This response causes
distortion of
∫ 1
q
Vq,p(z) dz = −qp log q due to underproduction. The following lemma shows
that this is the worst distortion that can happen when the firm is unregulated.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that an unregulated firm sells q¯ units at a price p¯ such that p¯ >
supz>q¯ V (z) . Let
OPTq¯ = max
q>q¯
∫ q
q¯
V (z) dz − (C(q)− C(q¯))
be the maximal additional surplus to society if the firm has produced q¯ units, and let
FPq¯ = max
q>q¯
qmin(p¯, V (q))− q¯p¯− (C(q)− C(q¯)),
be the maximal additional profit to the firm if it has produced q¯ units and commits to price
at most p¯. Then
OPTq¯ 6 FPq¯ + ϕ(q¯)p¯,
where
ϕ(q) =


1
e
, if q < 1
e
−q log q, if q > 1
e
,
is the least decreasing majorant of q 7→ −q log q.
The lemma does not assume that selling q¯ units or more is optimal for the firm. Therefore,
the assertion in the lemma still holds even if the best response for an unregulated firm is to
produce less than q¯ units at a possibly higher price than p¯.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. We can assume that FPq¯ = 0, otherwise replace C with C˜ such that
C˜(z) = C(z) if z 6 q¯ and C˜(z) = C(z) + FPq¯ if z > q¯.
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Let q′ ∈ argmaxq
∫ q
q¯
V (z) dz − (C(q)− C(q¯)). Let c′ = C(q′)− C(q¯).
Since the firm does not want to produce more, it follows that zV (z)−C(z) 6 q¯p¯−C(q¯)
for every z > q¯, so that
V (z) 6
q¯p¯+ C(z)− C(q¯)
z
6
q¯p¯+ c′
z
,
for q¯ < z 6 q′.
Since V (z) 6 p¯ for z > q¯ it follows from the definition of q′ that c′ 6 (q′ − q¯)p¯. Let
q′′ = q¯ + c
′
p¯
, so q′′ 6 q′. Then
∫ q′
q¯
V (z) dz − c′ 6 (q′′ − q¯)p¯+
∫ q′
q′′
q¯p¯+ c′
z
dz − c′ 6 (q′′ − q¯)p¯ +
∫ 1
q′′
q¯p¯+ c′
z
dz − c′
=
∫ 1
q′′
q¯p¯+ c′
z
dz = −q′′p¯ log q′′ 6 ϕ(q¯)p¯,
where the first step uses the fact that V (z) 6 p¯ for q¯ < z 6 q′′, the second to last step follows
from q¯p¯+ c′ = q′′p¯, and the last step follows from q¯ 6 q′′ and the definition of ϕ.
For q¯ = 0 and p¯ = v¯ the lemma has the following corollary which is interesting for its
own sake. It bounds from below an unregulated firm’s profit in a market with a high social
optimum. We are unaware of previous statements of this corollary, but similar arguments to
those in the proof of Lemma 5.1 with zero cost appeared in Roesler and Szentes (2017).
Corollary 5.2. For an unregulated firm which best responds to (V, C), we have
FP > OPT− v¯
e
.
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5.2 Lower bound on worst-case regret
For a policy ρ let
WCR(ρ) = max
V,C,q,p
RGRT
where the maximum ranges over all (V, C) and all the firm’s best responses (q, p) to (V, C)
under ρ.
For a policy ρ let ρ¯(q) = maxq′6q,p′6v¯ ρ(q′, p′) be the maximal revenue the firm can get
under ρ from selling q units or less, and let ρˆ(q, p) = maxq′>q,q′p′6qp ρ(q′, p′) be the maximal
revenue under ρ if the firm sells at least q units and the revenue from the marketplace is at
most qp. As shown in Figure 3, ρ¯(q) is the maximum of ρ in the light-gray area, and ρˆ(q, p)
is the maximum of ρ in the dark-gray area.
ρ¯(q)
ρˆ(q, p)
0 1
v¯
q
p
z
pq
z
Figure 3: Definitions of ρ¯(q) and ρˆ(q, p)
We first show that the worst-case regret under a policy is at least the maximum subsidy
that this policy offers.
Claim 2. Fix a policy ρ. Then WCR(ρ) > ρ(q, p)− qp for every q, p.
Proof. If ρ(q, p) 6 qp the assertion follows from the fact that regret is nonnegative. Assume
that ρ(q, p) > qp and consider the inverse-demand function Wq,p and a fixed cost ρ(q, p).
Then the firm will produce q units at price p, with FP = 0 and
RGRT = DSTR = ρ(q, p)− qp,
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because of overproduction.
We then show that, if the firm doesn’t receive sufficiently more revenue from producing
more, there is sizable regret due to underproduction.
Claim 3. Fix a policy ρ. Let q 6 q ∈ [0, 1] and let p ∈ [0, kα]. If ρˆ(q, p) 6 ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα
then
WCR(ρ) > (1− α)(ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα)− qp log q.
Proof. 1. If ρ¯(q)− ρ¯(q) 6 (q − q)kα, then consider the inverse-demand function Vq,p and
a cost function such that producing q units or less is costless and producing additional
units incurs a fixed cost of (q − q)kα. The firm will produce at most q units, with
FP = ρ¯(q) and
DSTR > (q − q)(v¯ − kα)− qp log q = (1− α)(q − q)kα − qp log q,
because of underproduction. Therefore
RGRT = (1− α)FP + DSTR > (1− α)(ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα)− qp log q.
2. If ρ¯(q) − ρ¯(q) > (q − q)kα, then consider the inverse-demand function Vq,p and zero
cost. The firm will produce at most q units, with FP = ρ¯(q) > ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα and
DSTR > −qp log q because of underproduction. Therefore
RGRT = (1− α)FP + DSTR > (1− α) (ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα)− qp log q.
Combining Claims 2 and 3, we show that the regulator suffers sizable regret either from
underproduction or from overproduction.
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Claim 4. Fix a policy ρ. Let q 6 q ∈ [0, 1] and let p ∈ [0, kα]. Then
WCR(ρ) > min
(
(1− α)(ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα)− qp log q, ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα − qp
)
.
Proof. If ρˆ(q, p) > ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα then let q′, p′ be such that q′p′ 6 qp, q′ > q and
ρ(q′, p′) = ρˆ(q, p). By Claim 2
WCR(ρ) > ρ(q′, p′)− p′q′ > ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα − qp.
If ρˆ(q, p) < ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα then WCR(ρ) > (1 − α)(ρ¯(q) + (q − q)kα) − qp log q by
Claim 3.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We need to show that WCR(ρ) > min ((1− α)qkα − qp log q, q(kα − p)) for every q, p. This
follows from Claim 4 with q = 0.
Remark 2. The proof of Claim 4 for the case of q = 0 relies only on fixed cost functions. So
does the proof of Theorem 3.1.
5.4 Upper bound on worst-case regret
We consider a policy of the form
ρ(q, p) = min(qk, qp+ s). (7)
We bound the regret from (7) separately for the case of overproduction and the case of
underproduction.
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Claim 5. The regret from overproduction under (7) is at most
max ((1− α)k, s) .
Proof. Let q∗ be a socially optimal quantity, let p∗ = V (q∗), and assume that the firm chooses
(q, p) with q > q∗ and p 6 V (q) 6 p∗. Let c¯ = C(q)− C(q∗). Then
DSTR = c¯−
∫ q
q∗
V (z) dz 6 c¯− (q − q∗)p, (8)
and
c¯ 6 ρ(q, p)− ρ(q∗, p∗) (9)
since (q, p) is a best response. Therefore
RGRT = (1− α)FP + DSTR 6 (1− α)(ρ(q, p)− c¯) + c¯− (q − q∗)p 6
(1−α)ρ(q∗, p∗)+ρ(q, p)−ρ(q∗, p∗)−(q−q∗)p 6 (1−α)ρ(q∗, p∗)+ρ(q, p)−ρ(q∗, p)−(q−q∗)p 6
(1− α)ρ(q∗, p∗) + (q − q∗)(ρ(q, p)/q − p) 6 (1− α)q∗k + (1− q∗/q)s 6
(1− α)q∗k + (1− q∗)s 6 max((1− α)k, s).
where the first inequality follows from (3), the fact that c¯ 6 C(q) and (8); the second
inequality follows from (9); the third inequality follows from the fact that p 6 p∗ and the
fact that p 7→ ρ(q, p) is monotone increasing; in the fourth inequality, ρ(q, p) − ρ(q∗, p) 6
(q − q∗)ρ(q, p)/q because q∗ 6 q and q 7→ ρ(q, p)/q is decreasing; the fifth inequality follows
from ρ(q∗, p∗) 6 (1− α)q∗k, ρ(q, p) 6 qp+ s, and q 6 1.
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Claim 6. The regret from underproduction under (7) is at most
max
q
qmax((1− α)k, v¯ − k)− q
(
k − s
q
)
log q.
Proof. Let q∗ be a socially optimal quantity and assume that the firm chooses (q, p) with
q 6 q∗.
If q∗(k − V (q∗)) 6 s then ρ(q∗, V (q∗)) = q∗k and ρ(q, p) = qk. Therefore, since the firm
prefers to produce q over q∗ it follows that C(q∗) − C(q) > (q∗ − q)k which implies that
DSTR 6 (q∗ − q)(v¯ − k) and
RGRT 6 (1− α)ρ(q, p) + DSTR 6 (1− α)qk + (q∗ − q)(v¯ − k) 6 max((1− α)k, v¯ − k).
If q∗(k − V (q∗)) > s then let q¯ ∈ [q, q∗) be such that z(k − V (z)) 6 s for q < z < q¯ and
z(k − V (z)) > s for z > q¯. (q¯ is the point at which the subsidy is used up, except that if
it was already used up before q then q¯ = q). Let p¯ = k − s/q¯. Then it follows from the
definition of q¯ that p¯ > supz>q¯ V (z).
By Lemma 5.1 there exists some z∗ ∈ [q¯, q∗] such that
∫ q∗
q¯
V (z) dz − (C(q∗)− C(q¯)) 6 z∗p− q¯p¯− (C(z∗)− C(q¯)) + ϕ(q¯)p¯,
with p = min(p¯, V (z∗)). Since z∗ > q¯ and p 6 p¯ it follows from the definition of ρ that
ρ
(
z∗, p
)− z∗p > ρ(q¯, p¯)− q¯p¯ = q¯(k − p¯) =⇒ z∗p− ρ (z∗, p) 6 q¯(p¯− k).
Since the firm prefers to produce q over z∗ it follows that
ρ
(
z∗, p
)
6 ρ(q, p) + (C(z∗)− C(q)).
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The last three inequalities and C(q¯) 6 C(q∗) imply
∫ q∗
q¯
V (z) dz 6 C(q∗)− C(q) + ρ(q, p)− q¯k + ϕ(q¯)p¯. (10)
Therefore
DSTR =
∫ q∗
q
V (z) dz − (C(q∗)− C(q)) =
∫ q¯
q
V (z) dz +
∫ q∗
q¯
V (z) dz − (C(q∗)− C(q))
6 (q¯ − q)v¯ − q¯k + ρ(q, p) + ϕ(q¯)p¯ 6 (q¯ − q)(v¯ − k) + ϕ(q¯)p¯,
where the first inequality follows from (10) and V (z) 6 v¯, and the second from ρ(q, p) 6 qk.
It follows that
RGRT 6 (1− α)ρ(q, p) + DSTR 6 (1− α)qk + (q¯ − q)(v¯ − k) + ϕ(q¯)p¯ 6
q′max((1− α)k, v¯ − k)− q′p¯ log q′ 6 q′max((1− α)k, v¯ − k)− q′(k − s/q′) log q′,
for some q¯ 6 q′ < 1 such that ϕ(q¯) = −q′ log q′. Here the last inequality follows from the
fact that p¯ 6 k − s/q¯ 6 k − s/q′.
5.5 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Note first that from (5) with q = 1 and p = 0 we get rα > (1− α)kα = v¯ − kα.
Consider the policy (7) with k = kα and sα 6 s 6 rα.
Since s 6 rα and v¯ − kα = (1 − α)kα 6 rα it follows from Claim 5 that the regret from
overproduction is at most rα.
By Claim 6 to prove that the regret from underproduction is at most rα it is sufficient to
prove that (1−α)qkα− q(kα−s/q) log q 6 rα for every q ∈ [0, 1]. For q = 1 this follows from
the fact that (1−α)kα 6 rα. Let q < 1 and let p = kα−s/q. Let q′ > q. Then q′(kα−p) > s
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and by the assumption on s this implies that (1− α)q′kα − q′p log q′ 6 rα. Since this is true
for every q′ > q it follows by continuity that (1− α)qkα − qp log q 6 rα, as desired.
5.6 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Let (qα, pα) achieve the maximum in the definition of rα in (5).
1. Assume that ρ(q, p) > qkα for some q 6 qα and some p. Then ρ¯(q) > qkα and therefore
ρ¯(q) + (qα − q)kα > qαkα. Therefore, by Claim 4 with q = qα and p = pα,
WCR(ρ) > min
(
(1− α)(ρ¯(q) + (qα − q)kα)− qαpα log qα, ρ¯(q) + (qα − q)kα − qαpα
)
> min((1− α)qαkα − qαpα log qα, qα(kα − pα)) = rα.
2. Suppose that ρ(q, p) < qp+sα for every q, p. Then there exists some q ∈ [0, 1], p ∈ [0, kα]
such that (1−α)qkα−qp log q > rα and q(kα−p) > maxq′,p′(ρ(q′, p′)−p′q′) > ρˆ(q, p)−qp,
implying ρˆ(q, p) < qkα. By Claim 3 with q = 0 we get that WCR(ρ) > rα.
3. Suppose that ρ(q, p) > qp+ rα for some q, p. Then WCR(ρ) > rα by Claim 2
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